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STATE OF UTAH 
MARINDA DAY, 
Plaintiff-AP pellant 
vs. 
LORENZO SMITH & SON, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent 
PETITION 
FOR 
REHEARING 
Case No. 
10256 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., a Utah corporation, de-
fendant and respondent herein respectfully petitions this 
Honorable Court for a rehearing and reargument in the 
above entitled case. The petition is based upon the fol-
lowing grounds: 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO PATROL-
MAN SHERWOOD'S TESTIMONY ON THE 
GROUND NO PROPER FOUNDATION HAD BEEN 
LAID SO THE OBJECTION TO "ANY OPINION" 
WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED. 
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POINT II. 
THE PATROLMAN'S TESTIMONY ON POINT 
OF IMPACT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THERE 
WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT 
THE TESTIMONY OF PATROLMAN SHERWOOD. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant and respondent, pe-
titioner herein, prays that the judgment and opinion of 
the court be re-examined and a reargument permitted of 
the entire case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I, Stephen B. Nebeker, one of the attorneys for the 
defendant and respondent, do hereby certify that I have 
carefully examined and considered the foregoing petition 
for rehearing, know the contents thereof, and that in my 
opinion the same is well founded in point of law and is 
not made for the mere purpose of delaying the deter-
mination of said cause. 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO PATROL-
MAN SHERWOOD'S TESTIMONY ON THE 
GROUND NO PROPER FOUNDATION HAD BEEN 
LAID SO THE OBJECTION TO "ANY OPINION" 
WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED. 
In the original opinion handed down by this court 
it was held that a trial judge, in his discretion, may permit 
a qualified expert to give his opinion as to the point of 
the collision when a proper foundation for the opinion 
has been laid. 
When the patrolman was asked where the point of 
impact was, he testifed: 
A. "It was near the center line and my best opinion, 
it may have been-" 
Plaintiff's attorney objected to the answer as follows: 
"I will object to any opinion your Honor." (Italics 
ours) 
The objection made by plaintiff's attorney was a 
specific objection to "any opinion." Plaintiff's attorney 
did not object to the testimony on the ground no proper 
foundation had been laid. 
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by 
overruling the objection to "any opinion," because plain-
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tiff's attorney failed to object on the ground a proper 
foundation had not been laid. 
It is well settled that an objection to be good, must 
point out the specific ground of the objection, and if it 
does not do so, no error is committed in overruling it. A 
party is confined to the specific objections made by him 
and can have the benefit of no others. 53 Am. Jur. Sec. 
137. 
In 88 C.J.S. Trial Sec. 125 (b) the rule is stated as 
follows: 
"It is a rule of universal application that the 
objection is deemed to be limited to the ground or 
grounds specified and does not cover others not 
specified. In other words, where specific grounds 
are stated the implication is that there are no others, 
or, if others, that they are waived. A specific ob-
jection overruled will be effective to the extent of 
the grounds specified, and no further." 
In Wigmore's work on evidence, Vol. I, Sec. 18 
(Third Edition) the following rule is enunciated: 
"A specific objection overruled will be effec-
tive to the extent of the grounds specified and no 
further. An objection overruled, therefore naming 
a ground which is untenable cannot be availed of 
because there was another and tenable ground 
which might have been named but was not." 
(Italics ours) 
It is the duty of the objecting attorney to point out 
to the court and opposing counsel why the proffered testi-
mony is improper. 
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It is only fair that the trial judge should have an 
opportunity to pass upon the precise question involved, 
and that the nature of the objection should be pointed 
out. Furthermore, opposing counsel should have an op-
portunity to remove the objection or supply the defect 
by other testimony. 
Where evidence has been objected to as inadmissible 
for certain specified reasons, the objection will be deemed 
to be limited to the grounds which have been specified. 
Jones on Evidence Fifth Edition Sec. 976. 
This court has previously held that an appellant is 
entitled to a review of testimony admitted over his ob-
jection only on the grounds stated in the objection. In 
Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80 Utah 587, 16 P. 
2d 212, (1932) an action was brought to determine the 
title and ownership of two savings accounts. At the trial, 
appellant made an objection to testimony on the ground 
it was "irrelevent and immaterial self serving declarations 
on the part of the deceased." The objection was over-
ruled. On appeal appellant claimed for the first time 
that the testimony was incompetent under the provisions 
of the dead man statute. This court held: 
"The objection being overruled, the appellant 
is entitled to a review of the ruling only upon the 
grounds stated and pointed out by his objection, 
which were irrelevancy and immateriality and "self 
serving statements on the part of the deceased." 
The objection was properly overruled, for the prof-
fered evidence was both relevant and material. 
* * * Though we assume the witness because of her 
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interest to be incompetent by reason of the statute 
to testify in this case, yet, under the state of the 
record we are satisfied that question is not before 
us. The question not having been raised in the trial 
court, we do not feel at liberty to pass on the ques-
tion now argued by appellant in this court for the 
first time." (Italics ours) 
The following cases support the rule that a specific 
objection overruled will be effective to the extent of the 
grounds specified and no further. Eggermont v. Central 
Surety f5 Insurance Company, 24 N.W. 2d 809 (Iowa 
1946) (Objection to testimony of declaration based on 
conclusion, overruled; objection based on hearsay, held, 
not presented on appeal); Thornton v. Bench, 360 P. 2d 
1065 (Kansas 1961) (Plaintiff objected to admission of 
exhibit solely on ground of irrelevancy; plantiff's conten-
tion on appeal that the exhibit was hearsay, not con-
sidered); Kagan v. Levenson, 134 N.E. 2d 415 (Massa-
chusetts 1956) (Having stated specifically the basis of 
their objection, the defendants, in fairness ought not to 
be permitted to urge other grounds in this court) ; Tees-
dale v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 357 P.2d 4 (Montana 1960) 
(Hearsay objection not raised at trial, unavailable on ap-
peal); Jimison v. Frank L. McGuire, Inc., 355 P.2d 222 
(Oregon 1960) (specific objection on appeal not pre-
sented to trial judge, not available); Dobb v. Perry, 145 
S.W. 2d 1103 (Texas 1940) (A specific objection which 
has been overruled will be effective as a ground of com-
plaint on appeal only to the extent of the grounds named)· 
An examination of the record shows that plaintiff's 
objections were properly overruled. 
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Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Give us your judgment. 
Mr. Beesley: Make the same objection, your Honor. 
The Court: Let's find out if he has a judgment or giving an 
opinion. If he is giving an opinion, he can't. 
Q. Do you have a judgment as to where the point of im-
pact occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you tell us what that judgment is? 
Mr. Beesley: Objection, your Honor. 
The Court: It's overruled. He may give his judgment. 
A. As near the centerline and probably a little bit west. 
Mr. Beesley: I object to any Probability, your Honor. 
The Court: If you are confining it to your judgment-
Q. Just give us our best judgment. 
The Court: You can tell us your judgment. 
Mr. Beesley: I believe he said the centerline. 
A. Near the centerline. 
Q. Was it on the west or the east of the centerline? 
A. Do I have to answer that "Yes" or "No?" 
Q. Yes. 
A. My opinion is no good? 
Q. Just give us your judgment. 
The Court: You can give your judgment, Sergeant. 
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A. My judgment, slightly to the west of the centerline. 
Q. Would you say it was about a foot to the west of the 
centerline? 
A. I think that would be a fair figure. 
Q. It could have been a little further west? It could have 
been a little further east? 
A. Yes (R. 183-184) 
Plaintiff's general objection is obviously defective. 
One of the cardinal rules of evidence is that a general ob-
jection, if overruled, cannot avail the objector on appeal. 
See Wigmore Vol. I Sec. 18. 
This court has held that a general objection which 
does not point out the ground upon which it is made, 
does not merit consideration. 
In Culmer v. Clift, 14 Utah 286, 291, 47 Pac. 85 
(1896) this court held that a general objection overruled 
did not merit consideration on appeal. 
"The objection did not point out the ground 
upon which it was made, and therefore does not 
merit consideration. The point of the objection 
should have been particularly stated, in order to 
entitle it to consideration. This is the uniform rule. 
General objections to the admission of evidence are 
unavailable to the party making them, either on 
motion for new trial or appeal. The particular 
grounds of the objection must be stated, so that 
the trial court may understand the nature of the 
objection before passing upon it." (Italics ours) 
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The rule announced in the Clift case supra was cited 
with approval in In Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 
297 P. 2d 542 ( 1956) where this court said: 
. "It is further to be noted that the only objec-
t10n proponent made to the hypothetical question 
at the trial was the generalized one that it mis-
stated testatrix' phsyical condition, and that it did 
not include some known factors, without specify-
ing what the claimed defects were. The rule is that 
in order to preserve the objection for review on 
appeal the objector must point out specifically 
what she claims was erroneously included or 
omitted, which proponent failed to do." (Italics 
ours) 
Plaintiff's objection to the patrolman's testimony was 
on the specific ground of "opinion" and "probability." 
Plaintiff made no objection on the ground of lack of 
proper foundation. Neither the trial judge nor defendant's 
attorney were given an opportunity to remove the objec-
tion. The objection to "any opinion" did not raise the 
question of lack of foundation. It did raise the question 
of whether or not point of impact was a proper subject 
for opinion testimony. That was a specific objection which 
this court has now held was untenable. This court has in 
effect ruled that the objection which plaintiff made at the 
trial is without merit but that an entirely different objec-
tion, that of lack of proper foundation, is well founded. 
It is respectfully submitted that it is manifestly unfair to 
this defendant and the trial judge for this court to hold 
that the specific objection which was made, was properly 
overruled, but an objection which was not made, should 
have been sustained. 
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Plaintiff waived her objection to the patrolman's 
testimony on the ground no Proper foundation had been 
laid. 
This court has by its decision in the instant case, over-
ruled the Obradovich case supra, Culmer v. Clift supra 
and In Re Richards Estate supra. The opinion in the in-
stant case completely ignores the established rules regarding 
objections. If the defendant should be required to lay a 
proper foundation for an opinion, the plaintiff should be 
required to make the proper objection. It is respectfully 
submitted that this court should grant a rehearing to per-
mit argument on this matter. 
POINT II. 
THE PATROLMAN'S TESTIMONY ON POINT 
OF IMP ACT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Patrolman Sherwood's testimony on the point of im-
pact was cumulative evidence. Both Henry Kelly and 
his son Robert Kelly testified the impact occurred on the 
west (defendant's) side of the highway. 
Henry Kelly stated: 
A. (Mr. Kelly) Well, I am positive that the Chevrolet 
truck was no less than one half of its--of the entire width 
was across on the west side. Now, I am positive of that, 
at least of that much. (R 33) 
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Robert Kelly testified: 
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Do you have a judgment as to how 
far west of the center line the point of impact was be-
tween the truck and the Greenbriar? 
A. (Robert Kelly) I would say about half way. 
Q. Half of-
A. Half of the-
Q. Width of the car? 
A. Half of the width of the road. (R 3 84) 
There is no question about the admissibility of the 
testimony of Henry Kelly and Robert Kelly. They were 
both eye witnesses to the accident. Since that evidence was 
properly received, the only effect of the Patrolman's testi-
mony was cumulative. The erroneous admission of evi-
dence will not be considered reversible error where the 
only effect of the evidence is cumulative. 
"The erroneous admission of evidence will not 
be considered reversible error by the appellate court 
where the only effect of the evidence is cumulative 
to evidence properly received or facts admitted by 
the appellant. And the erroneous admission of evi-
dence becomes immaterial if the point involved has 
been proved by adequate and direct testimony or 
where it adds little if anything to the facts other-
wise established in the record, particularly where 
the facts otherwise established amply justify the 
factual and legal conclusions of the court. * * *" 
5 Am Jur 2d Sec. 800, p. 241. (Italics ours) 
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See 5A C.J .S. Sec. 17 3 ( b) page 1018 ; Schofield v. 
Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 
342 ( 1934) (Holding erroneous admission of evidence will 
not be considered reversible error when the effect of the 
evidence is cumulative) . 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of the 
patrolman could not possibly have been prejudicial in view 
of the affirmative testimony of the Kellys. 
In Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines 232 P.2d 572 
(Cal. 1951) when an officer's opinion on point of impact 
was admitted the court held it could not have been preju-
dicial stating: 
"Appellants argue the question of the admis-
sibility of Edward's (police officer) opinion as if it 
were the most vital evidence in the case. They 
greatly overemphasize and exaggerate its impor-
tance. Edwards had testified, as did several other 
witnesses, as to what he observed at the scene of the 
accident. On direct examination he gave the rea-
sons upon which his opinion was predicated. Eye 
witnesses testified as to the point of impact. Two 
other officers, at least equally competent, gave 
contrary opinions based upon the same facts. The 
jury had all this evidence before it. Under these 
circumstar.ces, assuming that it was error to permit 
Edwards to give his opinion as to the point of im-
pact, such error could not have been prejudicial. 
The transcript in this case covers some 1620 pages. 
A great deal of this record is devoted to the issue of 
where and how the collision occurred. The case was 
hotly contested and well tried on both sides. During 
such a trial it would be a rare occurrence indeed 
if some error in the admission or exclusion of evi-
dence did not occur. * * * After reading this re-
cord we are convinced that Edwards' testimony, 
whether rightfully or wrongfully admitted, played 
a very minor part in the ultimate determination 
of the case. (Italics ours) 
The testimony of patrolman Sherwood played a very 
minor role in the ultimate determination of this case. It 
is particularly true in view of the patrolman's voluntary 
statement that his opinion was "no good." (R. 184) 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THERE 
WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT 
THE TESTIMONY OF PATROLMAN SHERWOOD. 
This court held in the instant case that a trial judge, 
in his discretion, may permit a qualified expert to give his 
opinion as to the point of a collision when a proper foun-
dation for the opinion has been laid. 
Sherwood's qualifications as an expert in accident 
investigations were not questioned. A review of Sher-
wood's testimony shows there is ample evidence to support 
his opinion as to the point of impact. 
Sherwood was standing less than ten feet from the 
accident when it happened. 
Q. (Mr. Beesley) Do you have an opinion as to how far 
from the center of the road you were standing? 
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A. (Patrolman Sherwood) About ten feet. (R 179) 
Sherwood's attention was drawn to the impact by the 
noise being so close to him. 
Q. (Mr. Beesley) What was the first thing that occurred 
that drew your attention that an accident had happened? 
A. (Patrolman Sherwood) The noise of the impact being 
so close to me. (R 177) 
Sherwood was practically an eye witness to the col-
lision as he turned in less than a second and saw the Davis 
vehicle take off down the pavement, skid and then roll 
over one complete turn. 
Q. (Mr. Beesley) All right. Would you describe the se-
quence of events after you heard the noise? 
A. (Patrolman Sherwood) The noise was more to my 
rear and to my right, so I just turned to the right and saw 
this Davies vehicle taking off down the pavement on the 
right or east side of the highway and it travelled some 
distance, and then it turned sideways and skidded and then 
rolled one complete turn. (R 177, 178) 
Sherwood went to the drawing board and drew the 
skid marks left by the Davies vehicle after the impact, 
the position of the Davies vehicle when he first saw it, 
where the Davies vehicle came to rest, where he was stand-
ing on the highway, where the other vehicles were on the 
highway and where the patrol car was located. (R 178, 
179) 
Sherwood measured the distance from the point of 
impact to where the Robert's vehicle and the defendant's 
vehicle came to rest. 
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Q. (Mr. Beesley) Now, where did the Roberts vehicle 
come to rest? 
A. (Patrolman Sherwood) About three hundred and ten 
feet on down the highway from this point that he-the 
two of them came together. 
Q. Three hundred ten feet down the highway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from what point did you measure three hundred 
ten feet? 
A. From a point near the center of the highway just back 
of where I was standing. 
Q. I see. And where did the Mitchell vehicle come to 
rest? 
A. It went on towards the south about a hundred and 
fifty feet from the same point and pulled off on the right 
hand side of the road, as the photo will so indicate. 
Q. How were these measurements taken? 
A. By tape measure. (R 178) (Italics ours) 
Sherwood measured the distances to each vehicle from 
a point near the center of the highway just back of where 
he was standing. The patrolman examined the roadway 
where the two vehicles collided. 
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) I see. Now, you did examine the road-
way where these two vehicles had collided, did you not? 
A. (Patrolman Sherwood) Yes. 
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Q. And you found that there was considerable debris 
on the road there, did you not? 
A. Well, I wouldn't know about the considerable amount, 
but there was debris. 
Q. From your examination of the road, you made a de-
termination as to the approximate point of impact, did 
you not? 
A. Yes. (R 182) 
The patrolman examined the two vehicles involved 
in the collision. 
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Did you examine the side of the '49 
Chevrolet to determine what damage had been done to it? 
A. (Patrolman Sherwood) Yes. 
Q. Well, first of all, let me ask you if you saw the Roberts 
car or the Davies car-I believe it was owned by Mr. 
Davies, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And driven by Mr. Roberts. Did that car make a 
complete roll-over? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was it damaged on all sides? 
A. It was pretty well damaged on both sides and the top 
and the windshield because it made one complete roll. 
Q. Was the windshield cracked, split? 
A. I am sure it was. I can't be positive at this time. 
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Q. Did you ever see the Corvair driven by Mr. Mitchell 
after the impact occured? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you examine that car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you tell us what damage appeared to be on the 
Corvair? 
A. It was scraped pretty well from the-the entire left 
side of the body, tearing off some of the chrome molding 
and gouging it rather deeply. I don't believe there was any 
place that it went clear through the body, but it scraped 
the paint off the full length of it. (R 185) 
Sherwood had a conversation with Mr. Roberts after 
the accident happened. 
Q. What did Mr. Roberts say when you asked him 
whether he had seen the lights of the officer's car? 
A. He said he didn't see them. 
Q. Did you ask him if he realized that there had been an 
accident there? 
MR. BEESLEY: Same objection. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may 
answer. 
A. I am sure I did. 
Q. What did he answer? 
A. He said he didn't see any of them. 
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Q. Didn't see anything? 
A. I'm not sure if that is the words he used, but basically 
that was his answer. (R 188) 
Sherwood also examined the photographs of the acci-
dent scene taken by Sheriff Jackson to refresh his memory 
as to the collision. (R 175) 
A review of all of the patrolman's testimony clearly 
shows the trail court did not abuse its discretion in per-
mitting the patrolman to testify as to the point of impact. 
This is particularly true in view of the fact no objection 
was made to the patrolman's testimony on the ground a 
proper foundation had not been laid. This court has pre-
viously held that a trial court must be allowe.d a con-
siderable latitude of discretion when confronted with the 
question of admissibility of expert opinion testimony. 
See Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d 
275, 342 P. 2d 1094 (1959); Joseph v. W. H. Groves 
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330 
(1957). 
When a trial judge, in the use of his discretion, has 
permitted an expert to state his opinion, the decision of the 
trial judge should be sustained unless it clearly appears that 
he was in error in his judgment. The record in the instant 
case affirmatively shows that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion, but properly permitted the patrolman to 
state his opinion as to the point of impact. 
• 
CONCLUSION 
This court has held that a specific objection to opin-. 
ion testimony was properly overruled but that an objec-
tion which was never made should have been sustained. In 
all fairness and justice defendant and the trial court should 
have been given an opportunity to correct the alleged 
error. This court has previously held that a specific ob-
jection is only good on the ground stated. The objection 
to "any opinion" did not raise the question of foundation. 
The objection was based on the theory that the opinion 
went to the very issue to be decided by the jury. This 
court has previously held that such an objection is without 
merit. The trial court properly overruled the objection to 
"any opinion" and permitted the patrolman to testify on 
the point of impact to help the jury determine what 
happened. 
The patrolman's testimony on point of impact was 
not prejudicial in view of the eye witness testimony of 
Henry Kelly and Robert Kelly. The testimony of the 
patrolman was only cumulative, and if its admission was 
error, it was not prejudicial. 
A full review of Sherwood's testimony clearly shows 
there was abundant evidence to support his opinion. The 
record shows that Sherwood heard the sound of the colli-
sion, saw one of the vehicles immediately after impact as it 
careened down the highway, saw the skid marks left by the 
plaintiff's vehicle, examined the debris on the road, ex-
amined the vehicles, talked to the driver of the plaintiff's 
vehicle, made measurements and placed all the information 
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on a drawing board before the jury. All these facts, when 
considered together, clearly show the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting the patrolman to testify 
on the point of impact. 
For the foregoing reasons defendant earnestly requests 
this court to grant a rehearing. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Stephen B. Nebeker 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
